The United Fruit Company in Central America: A Bargaining Power Analysis by Orozco, Constance
TEXAS PAPERS ON LATIN AMERICA
Pre-publication working papers of the
Institute of Latin American Studies
University of Texas at Austin
ISSN 0892-3507
The United Fruit Company in Central America:
A Bargaining Power Analysis
By Constance Orozco
ILAS/Graduate School of Business
University of Texas at Austin
Paper No. 91-07
The United Fruit Company in Central America:
A Bargaining Power Analysis
Constance Orozco
ILAS/Graduate School of Business
University of Texas at Austin
Introduction
The basic premise of this paper is to apply Thomas A. Poynter's model of
bargaining power determination 1 to the specific case of the United Fruit Company' s
(UFCO's) activities in Central America, with an emphasis on the historical
development of the firm and its relations with the four countries affected by it: Costa
Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama.2
The Model: Government-TNC Relations and Bargaining Power
Poynter's theory of bargaining power is actually a comprehensive model for
determining the negotiating position of a multinational or transnational enterprise
toward its host government. Utilizing various factors, Poynter constructs a flexible
basis for corporate and national strengths and weaknesses that is applicable to
virtually any case of government- TNC relations.
Three general determinants of bargaining power are outlined by Poynter: (1) The
company's core activities are those that are essential to industrial success; in the case
of UFCO, these would include marketing expertise, technological innovation, and
capital access. (2) Control refers to which of the actors has relatively more authority
over the skills and technology to be applied. As will be shown later, United Fruit has
been the source of this factor throughout its life. (3) Perceived versus actual power is
a very complex component of bargaining power. Essentially, host governments act
according to their observations of the current state of affairs; Central America has
been no different.
Beyond these broad categories, Poynter extends his factor model to specific
corporate and national determinants of bargaining power. The principal corporate
influences include: (1) Operational and managerial complexity, which is particularly
prohibitive to an underdeveloped nation lacking in the expertise and capital resources
to sustain a large and risky enterprise. (2) The number offoreign nationals in senior
subsidiary positions has been difficult to determine in UFCO's corporate structure;
however, characteristically the highest management positions are occupied by U.S.
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personne1.3 (3) Vertical integration/sourcing is a particularly pertinent factor in the
case of UFCO because of the company's preoccupation in establishing completely
integrated, independent enclave operations. We will examine this aspect further in
detail, as it applies to the penetration phase. (4) Exports, according to Poynter, have
a beneficial effect on a corporation' s bargaining power; UFCO is no exception to this
rule, as its exports are a large source of revenue for the Central American republics.
Among other determinants of corporate bargaining power, Poynter lists the
following: (1) The corporation' s impact on its host' s economy; the focus here is on
labor union strength and the quantity of individuals employed by the corporation.
Poynter feels that these are the most important indicators of a company's impact on
its host.4 (2) The strategic importance of the TNC is also considered of benefit to its
position. For UFCO, this seems to be a significant factor, since the banana industry
is among the top three sources of earnings for Central America. (3) Closely re1ated to
the second element is industry type. Banana production has several characteristics that
set it apart from other types of agribusiness. These will also be discussed in the
penetration phase of UFCO's development.
With respect to national bargaining power, Poynter distinguishes between political
and nonpolitical determinants. The latter consist of technology, resources, and market
access and attractiveness. In the case of UFCO, we have found that none of these
elements have had a significant impact on the hosts' bargaining power positions.
Technology is generated internally by the company; the only natural resources
necessary to production are land and labor, two readily available and easily acquired
factors; and the principal market for bananas is external, not within Central America.
As for the political influences on bargaining power, these are perhaps the strongest
factors. Bilateral and multilateral relations between the United States and the
countries of Central America have greatIy affected the position of UFCO in that area.
As we will see in the cases of Honduras and Guatemala, U.S. intervention in favor of
a prominent corporation is not rare.5 Closely tied to this is ideology. The location
and strategic importance of Central America to the United States have led to
numerous interventions over the years-military and economic-especially in the
cases of socialist influences, as we will see in the Guatemalan case. Finally, political
stability as a factor of bargaining power determination is very important in Central
America. In the course of our investigation, we have found that those governments
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that suffer from unstable regimes and social disorder are subject to more control by
TNCs.6
In addition to Poynter's factors of bargaining power determination, two more
should be added in the study of UFCO in Central America: foreign legislation, as
seen in the effects of U.S. antitrust laws on UFCO's monopolistic position, and the
historical development of the region as a part of the Third World. A more in-depth
look at this aspect follows.
Central America: Historical and Geopolitical Implications
As underdeveloped countries, the Central American Republics historically have been
subjected to economic, political, and military domination by outside forces,
particularly the United States. In this paper, the objective is to focus on the
economic and political forces at work in the region as they apply to TNC
penetration.
Economically, the Central American Republics are essentially victims of the law of
comparative advantage. These countries are traditional exporters of agricultural
products due both to their rich volcanic soils and their lack of industrial capacity. At
the same time, however, they are severely limited in the types of agricultural
products they may provide for their principal market-the United States. The so-
called Banana Republics or dessert economies cannot compete with their neighbor to
the north: their primary exports are coffee, bananas, beef, coconut, pineapple, and
sugar, not because that is all their lands will produce, but because that is all they can
sell competitively in the world market.7 Attempts at industrialization-such as those
made through import substitution policies-have been hindered by U.S. trade and
commercial policies that have in effect protected U.S. industries from Central
American ones attempting to enter the market. A primary factor in this protectionism
is the relative strength of U.S. corporate lobbies in determining trade policy. U.S.
initiatives to provide markets for Central American produce, such as the Caribbean
Basin Initiative, have consisted of purchasing only certain nontraditional exports or
products unavailable in the United States while restricting any product that might
compete with U.S. producers. In a similar vein, technical or monetary assistance for
Central America's independent industrial development has been restricted to those
areas that contribute to U.S. industry, such as maquiladoras providing cheap labor,
rather than areas that would lead to independent, competitive production. Politically,
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the countries of Central America are carefully, and quite effectively, manipulated by
the United States, a course not likely to be altered in the near future because the
region is simply too important to that country to permit its freedom in commercial
or national security issues.
One of the most distinctive elements of U.S. attachment to and involvement with
Central America is the role played by transnational corporations in the historical
development of the region. A considerable part of the railway and communications
systems and public utilities was provided by the first TNCs to be established in these
countries: the banana companies of United Fruít and Standard Fruit. The construction
and maintenance of such infrastructure could be accomplished only through large and
intensive injections of capital-and mainly by foreign investors, considering the
conditions of the countries described above.
Such TNC "contributions," although beneficial to the countries being studied, have
also had detrimental effects on their national economies and political lives. The
historical dependence of Central America has been intensified and consolidated
through the dependence on foreign capital and investors.8 The formation of
monopolies and oligopolies throughout the region has led to distortions within the
individual economies and a futile competitive struggle between small national firms
with little access to capital or financing and huge transnational conglomerates with
virtually unlimited power. The most vivid example of this phenomenon is the
experience of United Fruit in Central America.
The History of United Fruit: Bargaining Power Maximization
According to various authors on the subject, UFCO's activities in Central America
can be characterized by three phases: penetration, consolidation, and expansion, which
closely correspond to the polítical economies adopted by the national governments
over time.9 The first of these phases encompasses the period of UFCO's introduction
as a banana company: 1899-1930. The second phase establishes UFCO's presence in
the Central American economic framework as one of the principal TNCs and an
"enclave producer";10 it includes the internationally unstable years from 1930-1947,
as well as the period of reconstruction from 1948-1969. The third phase incorporates
UFCO into the new international order of the 1970s and 1980s, when financial
difficulties begin to play an important role in the Central American economies and
the issue of corruption within the governments and the TNCs becomes significant.
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Together, these three phases of United Fruit's involvement in Central America
provide a view of that company's importance in the development of the region and
the continuing infIuence of TNCs in the polítical and economic spheres of these
countries.
Phase 1: Penetrarían
The first phase, penetration, can be described as UFCO's introduction to banana
production.11 From its origin as a joint venture between Costa Rican entrepreneur
and railroad builder Minor Keith and the Boston Fruit Company in 1899,12 UFCO
experienced rapid growth and vertical integration until 1930.13
This period witnessed UFCO's acquisition or purchase of the following enterprises:
Boston Fruit Company's properties throughout Central America; Keith's lands and
companies in the area (Tropical Trading and Transport Company in Costa Rica and
Snyder Banana Company of Panama); several independent companies; 14 Hubbard
Zemurray Company (Cuyamel Fruit Company) in Guatemala; 15 Tela Railroad
Company and Truxillo Railroad Company in Honduras, the California-Guatemala
Fruit Corporation; and Chiriqui Land Company in Panama. Corporate successes
outside of the region included the acquisition of the British Elders and Fyffes
Shipping Company and the establishment of the Northern Railway Company in the
United States, which would later provide its construction services in Central
America. In addition, UFCO purchased-and was conceded in exchange for its railroad
construction contracts-great extensions of land in Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa
Rica.16
The results of all these transactions were: (1) monopoly power in banana exports
from Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Panama; (2) substantial control of the region' s
railway transpon and communications networks; (3) global control of the world's
banana market, especially the United States; and (4) the reduction of UFCO's
numerous competitors to one: the Standard Fruit and Steamship Company. By 1930,
UFCO held 1,409,148 hectares of land in Central America-corresponding to 4
percent of the region's land surface--of which only 76,553 were utilized for banana
production.17
Over the cOurse of three decades, UFCO's capital stock grew from $11.23 million
to $215 million,18 a large part of this attributable to its monopolistic expansion
through successful investments in subsidiaries and holdings in other independent
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firms. The company's participation in banana exports from the region was 82 percent
in 1930, representing 100 percent of Costa Rican, Guatemalan, and Panamanian
exports and 73 percent of those of Honduras. In relation to world banana production,
UFCO was responsible for 60 percent of the total, and 47 percent carne from these
four countries.19
UFCO's bargaining power during this phase of penetration was based primarily on
Central America' s lack of capital and socioeconomic infrastructure. Most of the
contracts signed between UFCO and the national governments included provisions for
the construction of railroads, which were essential to UFCO's operations as well as
beneficial to the countries in their desire to "open up" undeveloped areas to productive
uses.20 In some cases, the agreements involved not only permission to purchase or
utilize nationallands but actual concessions of thousands of acres in exchange for the
construction and maintenance of railroads that also remained in the hands of UFCO.21
Unfortunately for the Central American Republics, hundreds of miles of railroad in
the region are located in isolated areas and have never been connected to population
centers as means of national or international communication.
Another example of UFCO's influence in this area is its contribution to the banana
industry itself. A1though exports occurred before UFCO' s introduction,22 the firm
managed to intensify and integrate all aspects of the process from plantation to
embarkment and final marketing and distribution in the United States. A full
description and discussion of banana production ,methods is impossible here, but it is
important to indicate the unique features of the product under consideration: a highly
perishable fruit requiring the utmost care and speed in transportation and delivery.23
The first exporters of bananas produced them in enormous quantities, having to
dispose of over half the fruit due to spoilage and carelessness before it could arrive at
its final destination. With the advent of refrigerated ships in 1903 and advanced
packing techniques adopted over time, the idea of mass production and export became
conceivable and indeed profitable for those with the investment capabilities to exploit
it. UFCO happened to be the company willing to take the financial and poli tic al
risks involved in just such an enterprise, and playing on Central America's need for
investors, the company constructed its monopolistic base in the region through
vertical integration in its production process. Directly related to the technological
aspect of its bargaining power during this period was the company's capacity to
market and distribute its product. UFCO's output in Central America was not
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intended for the local markets, but for the United States.24 Only a company with vast
resources and previously established contacts could have taken advantage of the
overwhelming demand for bananas at this time. In addition, UFCO utilized its own
ships due to the Central American countries' lack of transport vessels. Within a
decade of its birth, the company had tripled its output and was virtually a fully
integrated producer.25
Turning to Poynter' s list of bargaining power determinants, we find that the banana
division had as its core activity the production and export of fruit. The subsidiary was
in complete control of its operations, from planting and harvesting to shipment and
distribution. There was very liule discrepancy in this first phase between perceived
and actual power, mainly because the countries recognized their incapacity to develop
independently of foreign capital. The need for special transport systems and
refrigeration was at the height of technological complexity. Practically all decision
making was in the hands of foreign nationals. Vertical integration was thorough and
highly centralized under company control. The size of the subsidiary was reflected in
its use of regional economies of scale and its ability to purchase or dispose of any
competitors.26 And the very type of industry lent UFCO strength due to the growing
demand for a unique product and the limitations surrounding its cultivation (climate,
temperature, proper drainage, special soil types, susceptibility to diseases, etc.) that
increased the risks involved in the company's operations. UFCO's bargaining power
from 1899-1930 can be described only as indomitable, a fact substantiated by one of
Poynter's own observations. According to his investigations, newly entering, large,
and strategically important subsidiaries are typicallY subjected to more host
government intervention.27 However, in the case of UFCO, all three of these factors,
in spite of their applicability to the company's position, were outweighed by Central
America's dependence on external capital and the need for infrastructural, as well as
industrial, development.
Phase 2: Consolidation
The consolidation phase takes place from 1931-1969 and consists of two stages: a
period of economic hardship for both UFCO and Central America that extends from
the Great Depression through the end ofWorld War 11and imposes severe limitations
on the company's operations and expansion; and a period from 1947-1969,
characterized both by the promotion of import substitution policies that allowed
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UFCO's horizontal integration and by export diversification strategies that
strengthened UFCO through banana exports but were accompanied by popular
movements and government reaction against TNC exploitation of natural resources.
The primary deterrninants of UFCO's bargaining power during the second phase are
therefore polítical and of external origin, in contrast to the company's internally
generated power in its first thirty years.
This phase is referred to as consolidation because it represents UFCO's decision-
making processes in the face of grave obstacles. UFCO's ability to overcome
increasing political risk and preserve its bargaining power position in Central
America during this period is reflected in its continuance as an oligopolistic force in
the region and its adaptation from enclave production to agribusiness.
Economic Hardship (1931-1946)
Decreased imports from the United States because of the international recession and
reduced output due to the spread of a harrnful fungus known as Panama disease led to
drastically diminished income for UFCO in the 1930s. The latter destroyed large
expanses of land dedicated to banana production and eventually forced UFCO to
relocate its primary facilities from the Atlantic to the Pacific coast. 28 Despite these
complications, however, the company displayed its adaptability by purchasing more
lands not affected by Panama disease and acquiring companies along the Pacific coast,
such as the Pirris Farm and Trading Company in Costa Rica and the Compañía
Agricola in Guatemala.29 Government agreements permitted UFCO to expand its
railroads and land holdings in these new areas, thus contributing to the company's
recovery.30 Meanwhile, railroads and communication networks were left behind as
subsistence agriculture reclaimed the abandoned territory on the Atlantic coast.31
With the onset of WWIl carne another period of slow growth and decreased exports. 32
Throughout this period, however, UFCO managed to maintain its average annual
net earnings at $26.5 million,33 and between 1939 and 1945 the average dividend paid
was $3.60 per share, the lowest occurring in 1943: $2.25 per share.34 These
economic successes were due to UFCO's export of strategic material s such as hemp,
rather than bananas.35 By 1947, however, the company had resumed expansive
activities in the banana sector, with the following contributions to the region's
GDPs: Costa Rica, 16.5 percent; Guatemala, 22.7 percent; and Honduras, 38.7
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percent. Of the countries' total exports, bananas represented 46 percent, 42 percent,
and 78 percent, respectively.36
Political Economies and Corporate Flexibility (1947-1969)
This period exhibits the most dramatic changes in UFCO's relations with the
countries of Central America. Import substitution policies since the 1930s had failed
to achieve many positive effects on these economies because of their lack of internal
development resources. And foreign direct investment during the late 1940s and early
1950s was dominated by fruit companies as they enhanced their infrastructures with
new techniques of preventing disease.37
Other U.S.-based companies entered the region at this time to avoid large tariffs
imposed on imports. As a result, we see an increasing dependence on TNCs in the
region.38 This is particularly true of UFCO, which continued to enhance its enclaves
with schools, telephone systems, electric plants, and sanitation services, in effect
transforming its divisions into isolated, self-sufficient societies that were more a part
of the parent company than of the host country.39 At the same time, these enclaves
remained the principal source of income for Central America, causing these countries
to push for revision of contracts they had signed in the 1920s that had exempted
UFCO from taxes on the company's imports and permitted unrestricted repatriation
of earnings. In 1949, taxes on these earnings were imposed at 15 percent in addition
to the existing export tax of about two cents per stem. By 1958, all three countries
had doubled the earnings tax to 30 perceot and obtained UFCO's agreement to deliver
many of its infrastructure works ioto government hands.40
UFCO's loss of bargaining power at this time was exacerbated by U.S. antitrust
legislation that forced the company to change its form of operations41 and by
individual countries' political retaliation for UFCO's failure to fulfill its contractual
obligations.42 In addition, 1954 witnessed serious popular reactions to UFCO's
presence in the region. The two most cited are the general strike by Honduran
plantation laborers and poli tic al response to the company's involvement in a CIA
plot to overthrow President Arbenz of Guatemala.43
The results of these political interactions between the countries of Central America
and UFCO were the change from monopoly to oligopoly power in the banana
industry, and an overall weakening of UFCO as a consequence of its own actions.
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This was reflected in the company's withdrawal from several areas in the late 1950s
and early 196Os.44
Concurrently, Central America's bargaining power during the 1960s can be said to
have grown partly through the forrnation of the Central American Common Market
(CACM), which combined the economies' efforts to industrialize and improve their
terrns of trade in relation to the rest of the world. A rusticated version of the import
substitution model, CACM's dealings met with little success in the manufacturing
area because of the unequal distribution of benefits among the countries involved and
the strength ofpressure groups promoting traditional export-Ied growth.45
By the end of the 1960s, UFCO had adapted its operations to these new
developments and was an active participant in the now more diversified econornies of
the area, purchasing portions of its bananas from local associate producers and
investing capital in other industries.46 Only one additional company had joined
UFCO and Standard Fruit as a major producer of bananas: Del Monte.47 And in 1968
the percentage of export income provided by bananas was still considerable: in Costa
Rica, 25 percent; Guatemala, 6.1 percent; and Honduras, 42.6 percent.48
An analysis of UFCO's bargaining power during this time period shows that many
factors have remained constant since 1900, in spite of political, social, and economic
transforrnations within the area. Thus, we can state that UFCO's core activities, as
well as its control of such activities, have experienced little alteration. The
nationalization of some infrastructure has reduced UFCO's influence over some
aspects of its operations, but the actual technological skills and access to capital have
remained in the hands of the individual subsidiaries and divisions.49
One factor that has definitely changed since 1947 is the power of UFCO as
perceived by the four countries. The nations of Central America have adopted more
independent stances over the years, attempting to reduce or diversify their dependence
on the United States. In particular, Costa Rica and Honduras have exhibited their
newfound bargaining positions in the area of banana production, the first by
initiating laws to permit other TNC's entry,50 and the second through a general
strike, which was supported by the government as a "patriotic stand." In spite of such
accomplishments, however, UFCO was perrnitted to retain its control in these areas
and to continue its process of consolidation, confirrning that the company's actual
power still outweighed any perception of certain weaknesses in its organization.
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In reference to corporate determinants of bargaining power, UFCO still exhibits its
superiority in handling the complexity of banana production. Although the level of
skills required for actual banana production is relatively simple, the process of
protecting the plantations and transporting the bananas to their point of sale is still
beyond the capacity of an underdeveloped country. In addition, the managerial
complexity of UFCO's operations is relatively high, involving decisions regarding
contingency plans in times of misfortune due to natural disasters (floods, hurricanes)
and disease, relations with unstable governments, and the coordination of operations
located in diverse areas (the preservation of economies of scale). As far as vertical
integration and export dependence are concerned, these two factors of bargaining
power continued in UFCO's favor. Contract revisions between Central American
governments and UFCO in the 1950s provided for additional taxation of the
company's earnings and a one-cent increase per stem of bananas exported; however,
the original provisions for exemptions on imports for the company's use remained.
Even though some of the railroads constructed by UFCO were nationalized during
this period, the agreements made gave UFCO excessive privileges in the price of
transporting its product and the amount of compensation it was paid. In addition,
UFCO's participation in regional exports was still very great in 1969, thus
preserving dependence on this transnational for export income.51
Perhaps the most significant factor determining UFCO's bargaining power here is
the size of its subsidiaries and their impact on local economies. According to
Poynter, the number of employees a firm has defines its bargaining position more
than the quantity of its sales or assets.52 This idea is certainly applicable in
Honduras, where over seventeen thousand53 employees of UFCO went on strike in
1954, bringing about a general labor stoppage.54 Despite its labor-intensive methods,
however, UFCO has not been subject to the amount of government intervention one
would expect according to Poynter's observations. This could be due, in part, to
UFCO's impact on the Honduran economy and the latter's incapacity to control the
activities of such a large corporation.
Closely related to the size and impact factors is UFCO's strategic importance to
Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Honduras. Poynter defines strategically important
industries as those affecting the political and economic development of the host
nation.55 According to this definition, UFCO would have little strategic importance
for Central America, due to its external market and its focus on consumer goods;
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however, considering the countries' relíance on tradítional, export-Ied growth
polícies, ít could be argued that UFCO has a significant role in the economic
development of Central America. The Guatemalan case of 1954 illustrates UFCO's
effect on one country's polítical development, and thought must be given to the
overall part played by Central America in the national security interests of the U nited
States. Given these factors, UFCO's bargaining power position is a strong one, and
its strategic importance very great. Poynter would anticipate a high degree of host
intervention in such an enterprise, but that has still not materialízed due to more
critical elements, such as the monopoly power of UFCO and the externally oriented
nature of the industry.
In contrast to the penetration phase, consolidation brought significant changes for
the Central American Republics in the exercise of their national bargaining power,
particularly with relation to poli tic al factors. More demands were made by
governments and unions during this time, and many of these were met, indicating
UFCO's large investments in the area and the difficulties and costs associated with
pulling out. 56
Intergovernmental relations moved in favor of UFCO in Guatemala, where, partIy
due to intense lobbying by that company, a U.S.-administered intervention led to the
overthrow of a "threatening" socialist government.57 Similarly, in Honduras ideology
had a significant role in the success of the 1954 strike. At first, the Honduran
government attempted to quell the workers' movement, believing it had be en
instigated by communist union leaders. After the removal of the supposed
troublemakers, however, the government supported the new leadership, which was
immediately backed by the U.S. CIO. In contrast to these two cases, Costa Rica's
bargaining power was strengthened by that country's polítical stability.58 UFCO's
willingness to make many concessions in this country may have been due to the
unsteadiness existent in the rest of Central America.
Overall, from 1947-1969, UFCO experienced some significant changes in its
relations with the governments of Central America and in its share of regional banana
production. However, in spite of all the political and economic fluctuations from the
Great Depression unti11969, once all the factors are taken into consideration, UFCO
managed to retain the greater part of its bargaining power in the region.
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Phase 3: Expansion
This final phase of UFCO's development covers the period from 1969 to the present
and describes the company's insertion into the new international division of labor. 59
In contrast to the tendency toward entry barrier relaxations and oligopolistic power
that dominated phase 2, the international and regional environment of the 1970s and
1980s changed again in the direction of fewer, larger companies, as well as their
expansion to other types of industry. Financial matters predominate over production
to maintain bargaining power in a time of increasing market globalization, as can be
seen in UFCO's absorption by United Brands (UB) in 1969 and that company's
subsequent acquisition by the American Finance Corporation. This expansionist
behavior occurs also in response to union consolidation, Central American
integration, and the imposition of further taxes by the national governments.
In 1969 UFCO merged with the AMK Corporation to create United Brands, an
enterprise then comprising seventeen large firms with thirty-one affiliates in
seventeen countries, including the United States.60 \Vith this merger began a series of
financial undertakings that would serve to sustain UB's position in Central America.
Among these were the purchase of equity in other fmit companies, including Del
Monte and Standard Fruit; the acquisition of more subsidiaries, not necessarily
involved in banaml production, such as Polymer and Numar;61 and intense
manipulative and coercive efforts aimed at controlling or determining political
decisions that would have serious implications for the company' s future.
In 1972 , UB sold its Guatemalan division, Bananera, to Del Monte, which became
a principal third competitor of UFCO and Standard Fruit. This decision was a result
of an antitrust suit brought against UFCO by the U.S. Justice Department, which
cited the company's violations of the 1890 Sherman Antitrust Act and the Wilson
Tariff Act and condemned its monopoly of the banana industry.62 In spite of the
sacrifice of UB' s properties in Guatemala, the company' s transactions in Costa Rica
and Honduras were intensified through the increased use of associate producers, the
introduction of new varieties of bananas, and the restoration and return to productive
use of Atlantic coastallands.63
In 1974, the Panama Accord64 was signed, after which Honduras, Pan ama, and
Costa Rica announced a $1 tax on each box of bananas exponed frorn their
countries.65 The affected TNCs reacted strongly in a process known as the "Banana
War,"66 which involved drastically reducing export volumes, cutting off salary
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negotiat:ons with umon officials, and offering bribes to promÍncnt govcrnment
personnel. In addition to thcsc measurcs, UB engaged in intense lobbying efforts to
persuade the individual congresses that these taxes would only result in reduced
consumption of bananas due to price and demand ine]asticity.67
Despite initial steadfastness, the Central American republics conceded, within
rnonths, by ]owering the tax to $.25-.35 per box and negotiating payments with the
companies.68 Later in ]974, the UniÓn de Países Exportadores de Banano (UPEB)
was created, inspired by the success of aPEC and with a membership of five
countl'ies: Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama.69 UPEB was
to be the forum for defending its members' interests against the TNCs' financial
prowess and to establish fail' and stab]e prices for bananas. Despite its weaknesses,70
UPEB managed to decl'ease UB's bargaining power in the region to some extent, but
its efforts wel'e complicated by Hurricane Fifi, which destroyed hundreds of hectares
of p]antations in Honduras, along with their infrastructure. 71 The reconstruction and
utilization of these lands could be accomplished only with large capita] investments,
for which the countries were forced to depend on UB and Standard Fruit.
In addition to the instability created by the hurricane and UPEB's competition, a
public outcry against UB arose in ]975 when it was discovered that the president of
Honduras had accepted bribes from that cornpany in exchange for tax reductions.72
Partly as an outcome of these dealings, Honduras nationalized UB' s railroad network
in 1976, in exchange for $], and the cornpany was given fu11right of usage for eight
years, during which time ir was responsible for the maintenance of the railroad and a11
related cquipment.73 The year before, Costa Rica had negotiated UB's participation in
an Atlantic development project, País, to incorporate small, independent banana
produc~rs into its sphere of operations under the supervision and coordination of
ASBANA, the Costa Rican National Banana Association.74 In Panama, the
government managcd to nationalize a11 of UB's lands in exchange for $151,000;
however, the company was to continue its operations as usual, with only a few
conditions.75
Regardless of the conceSSlOns made by UB during this period, the company's
opel'ations experienced expansion. In 1976, Compañía Bananera del Atlantico
(COBAL) of the Afrikanische Frucht Compagnie Laeisz, was purchased by UB, thus
climinating another competitor and the only independent producer in Costa Rica.
Another example of the company's continuing strength occurred when, in ] 977,
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under the auspices of UPEB, the Compañía Comercializad ora Multinacional de
Banano, S.A. (COMUNBANA) was created.76 Although COMUNBANA is looked
upon as a successful challenge to the oligopoly forces of the fruit companies, it is
limited by the demand from its particular markets (small and relatively poor) and by
the voluntary nature of its product sources (associate producers are given the option
of selling to one of the oligopolies or to COMUNBANA, the latter having less
capital and offering fewer incentives).77 Further relief for UB has been found through
successful pressures aimed at the Central American governments to lower export
taxes. Under the pretense of damages suffered through natural disasters, UB convinced
the Panamanian government to reduce its per box tax by $.20 for three years.
Honduras lowered its tax by $.10 and followed that measure with an export incentive
schedule that reduced the tax to $.05 per box if more than fifty-two million boxes
were exported. In Costa Rica a similar course was followed, beginning in 1983 with
a reduction from $.95 per box to $.70 per box and ending in 1986 at $.15 per box.78
Subsequent attempts by UPEB to reestablish the $1 per box tax were quickly crushed
by the companies.
The bargaining power of UB in the 1970s and 1980s is seen in its continuation as
the world's principal banana producer. The company's efforts at market diversification
have reduced its percentage of U.S. banana imports to about 30 percent-still the
primary importer for that country-while considerably increasing its share in the
West German, French, and Japanese markets.79 Nevertheless, labor disputes were a
prominent characteristic during these same years, due to the reduction of real salaries,
and defensive company responses included mass dismissals of laborers, technical
changes, more efficient methods of production, and the abandonment of unproductive
lands, as well as a decrease in the reliance on associate producers and the diversion of
lands to alternative uses, such as African palm oil extraction.80
In addition to regional efforts of UPEB and national actions to improve their
positions against TNC domination, international organizations entered the process of
integration and negotiation in 1985, with the involvement of UNCTAD IV in
establishing a program for regional price stability and development.81
Applying Poynter' s model to phase 3, we find a deterioration in the bargaining
power position of United Brands; however, the strengths manifested by Central
America are very limited in scope, and still present is the consciousness of UB's
superior management and marketing skills.
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As a result of its incorporation into UB, the core activities of UFCO were
substantially diversified over the course of the last two decades, including
investments in plastics companies, food processing, and palm oil enterprises.82
However, bananas still account for five times the profit of other food sales by that
company, and UB sti11 holds the number one position in world banana trade, with
28.7 percent of the market. 83
In terms of control, UB still determines the path and process of its operations, ,t<;
well as the skills to be applied. In equity control, the company underwent substantial
concentration in 1984 when Carl H. Linder acquired the shares of UB's two largest
stockholders, increasing his personal holdings to 55.9 percent. 84
The factor ofperceived versus actual power is also significant for this period, due to
the unstable relationships between UB and the individual governments of Central
America. In imposing the $1 per box tax in 1974, the countries were under the
impression that their positions were very strong and that UB would succumb to their
will. As it turned out, the fruit company won the Banana War, suffering only a
minor monetary setback in terms of its overall revenues. As in phase 2, the actual
power of the banana companies, due to their employment of thousands of laborers
and their importance as a source of revenue and capital for the region, was greater
than what the governments perceived.
Vertical integration is another area that displays UB's continued strength in the
area. A1though most of its "Great White" shipping fleet has been liquidated, UB still
owns Balboa Shipping in Panama and Elders and Fyffes.85 Most of its ocean
transport is accomplished through time-chartering with large reefer companies, which
save UB the capital expenditures required to maintain a private fleet.86 As for its
railroad networks, UB has handed most of these over to the Central American
governments, with the assurance of generous concessions in company usage.
Nevertheless, UB' s Tela Railroad Company of Honduras was the largest firm in that
country in 1982, with sales of $114.3 million.87 This relaxation of UB's vertical
integration has occurred only in the transport sector, however. The associate producer
program has not experienced growth, 88 and a11marketing activities are controlled by
UB.
As far as export importance is concerned, UB's role in expon revenues for Central
America has airead y been established.89 The potential for such income continues to
be far greater than the actual collections, as is reflected in the fact that only 11.5
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percent of the total value of bananas produced in the regIOn remams m the
countries.90
The monetary significance of these export revenues is one of the primary factors
detennining UB' s strategic importance in Central America. As a source of funds for
economic development, UB is well situated. But perhaps even greater influence exists
in the political sector of its operations. As a major U.S. TNC, UB represents
ideological and political stances taken by that country. The company's mere presence
in Central America has justified U.S. intervention in those countries for the purpose
of preserving stability and protecting U.S. national security in the past.91 Close ties
between the U.S.-based Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) and labor unions
in the banana industry are another aspect of this poli tic al importance of UB.
Related to this factor is the continued employment of thousands of Central
American workers by UB. The impact of this detenninant of corporate bargaining
power was felt when five thousand employees lost their jobs due to the shutdown of
Golfito and a 30 percent cut in Panamanian banana praduction.92
In summary, it could be said with some certainty that United Brand's bargaining
power position has been challenged by the host governments during the expansion
phase, and that Central America's defiance of TNC authority is likely to continue
during the 1990s. However, considering the financial crisis that has plagued these
countries for the last two decades and the historical potency of United Brands as a
highly diversified oligopoly, it is doubtful that any successful attempts at
nationalization--{)r even large-scale taxation-will occur in the near future.
Conclusion: Stalemate or Continued TNC Leverage?
This paper has attempted to demonstrate the bargaining power position of United
Fruit Company (United Brands) in Central America, based on the factors of analysis
provided in Poynter's model of intervention prediction. It is clear from the
infonnation set forth here that UB has been a powerful force in the historical
development of Central America-politically as well as economically. The principal
thread of UB' s effectiveness has been woven fram many factors: its organizational
formation as a monopolistic/oligopolistic enterprise; its access to large quantities of
capital for investments in the banana industry; its employment of a large percentage
of the region's labor force; the support it receives fram the U.S. government; and the
relative weaknesses inherent in Central America, as characterized by the continuing
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state ol' underdevelopment and geopolitical importance attributed to the reglOn.
Virtually all ol' Poynter's determinants are present here.
Over the years, UFCO's actions in Central America have become more
sophisticated and subtle; as the company has matured, so have its relations with its
host governments, confirming Poynter's hypothesis that, with time, the latter tend to
gain some advantages in their respective positions.93 Vnfortunately for Central
America, it seems that the present situation has brought those countries to a
standstill in terms of their reIations with VE. Rather than achieving the upper hand,
they have merely equilibrated their power to that of the TNCs, and further Ieverage to
their benefit seems unlikely to occur. The two sides in this dispute are faced with no-
win circumstances at the moment: VB has too much capital at stake to risk pulling
its operations out of a highly unstabIe but also quite profitabIe area, whiIe the
individual governments are confronting financial difficuIties that will not permit
them to risk an unemployment crisis or the loss of substantial revenues that would
result from intervention. One point remains in VB' s favor, however, and that will
probably never change: Central America, due to its geographicallocation, is subject
to U.S. domination today as it was at the turn of the century. The forms in which
such domination manifests itself may have become more sllbtle, bllt the dependence
continues and is sustained by powerflll Iobbies and U.S. foreign and trade policies
that greatly favor VB's power in the isthmlls. In Poynter's terminology, the
corporate determinants of bargaining power have be come more consolidated as a
whole, althollgh the company's operations have diversified into other nontraditional
prodllcts. At the same time, the nonpolitical and political determinants of national
bargaining power have remained relatively stable, failing to develop in favor of the
Central American countries primarily becallse of the region's political and economic
dependence on its neighbor to the north.
Notes
1. As explained in Multinational Enterprises & Government Intervention.
2. Panama is included in the definition of Central America as a means of simplifying this study
and due to UFCO' s influence in the development of that country.
3. Poynter suggests that the employment of more foreign nationals decreases a corporation' s risk
of intervention at first and later increases it. It is this writer's opinion that this factor is rather
insignificant in the case of UFCO, due to its enclave status and its monopolistic tendencies.
4. These two elements have opposing effects, according to Poynter, and for UFCO their combined
influence has been very dynamic as a determinant of bargaining power.
5. Although Poynter supports the idea that home govemments can have a strong impact on a
corporation's bargaining power, he explains that this aspect is a difficult one to documento However,
in the case of Central America, history has shown that national security interests and political and
ideological influences prevail in U.S. foreign policy toward the region.
6. Costa Rica represents the opposing view: a traditionally stable country, it has managed to attain
the most beneficial sacrifices on the part of UFCO, often using one rnc against another to improve
its national position.
7. Ffrench Davis, p. 302.
8. Foreign direct investment has been the region's principal source of capital, and one way of
encouraging investors has been the limited number of requirements for establishing ventures in the
area. The obvious result of this lack of government supervision and control mechanisms is the
formation of large, powerful transnational companies: oligopolies.
9. For examples, see Castillo Rivas, Ellis, and López Pérez. Castillo Rivas and Ellis both explain
two phases of the company's expansion through 1976. López adds a third phase from 1974-1984.
10. "Enclave" here refers to UFCO's establishment of isolated facilities with their own
infrastructure, basically independent of the host country.
11. An important point to note here is that UFCO was not the first company to become involved
in such an enterprise in Central America. In fact, the formation of its monopolistic and later
oligopolistic power has as a foundation the acquisition of many preexisting companies, both U.S.-
based and of independent or national ownership.
12. For a complete descriptian of the transactions involved in establishing United Fruit, consult
May and Plaza, pp. 5-6.
13. This included the establishment of research facilities, the preparation of lands, plantation,
harvest, transport networks (including railroad construction and purchase and shipping services
provided by company fleets), and marketing and distribution from company headquarters in the United
States. Such a procedure required far more capital than any of the countries had access to intemally.
See Martner, p. 475.
14. Oteri Salvatore; Bluefields Steamship Co.; Orr & Laubenheimer Co., Ltd.; McConnell Camors
Co., Ltd.; Camors-Weinberger Banana Co., Ltd.; and John C. Woods Co. See Ellis, p. 43.
15. Up to this time, Cuyamel was UFCO's principal competitor in the banana industry. The
purchase of this company was one of UFCO's most significant conquests in its monopoly formation.
16. See Ellis, pp. 43-45.
17. Ibid., p. 47. Vast land holdings ensured room for crop rotation as soils were depleted or in cases
af flooding ar discase.
18. May and Plaza, p. 7.
19. Ellis, p. 51.
20. Ibid., p. 65.
21. Consult Ellis, p. 44, for concessions made by Honduras and Guatemala. According to May and
Plaza (p. 10), 175,000 of the 400,000 acres owned by UFCO in Honduras were concessions in
exchange for railroad construction. Other incentives for UFCO included exemptions from port duties
and taxes.
22. Primarily through Keith's companies in Costa Rica and Panama. Prior to bananas, coffee was
the main export crop in Central America. It remains the largest source of export revenue for the
region.
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23. This time constraint is twenty-one to twenty-five days from harvest to consumption, according
to May and Plaza, p. 36.
24. Hymer develops this idea, explaining that the product market in this case is an extension of the
center's (U.S.'s) intemal market, rather than the host's market.
25. Ellis, p. 49.
26. By 1930 the only remaining competitor was the Standard Fruit and Steamship Corporation
(Ellis, p. 45).
27. Poynter, p. 55.
28. May and Plaza, pp. 143-144.
29. Ellis, p. 54-55.
30. By 1934 UFCO held 1,448,496 hectares, ofwhich fewer than 50,000 were dedicated to banana
production. This number is down from the 76,553 cited earlier because of abandonment of many areas,
but the total holdings increased by 39,348 hectares (Ellis, p. 57).
31. Bulmer- Thomas, p. 76. These lands were not sold, but were retained by UFCO for possible
future use.
32. At one time UFCO's operations sufferOOseverely a..<;the U.S. Navy requisitioned the
company's shipping fleet, and rationing virtually cut off purchases of needOOinsecticides and fuel
(Ellis, p. 59).
33. Ellis, p. 71.
34. Bulmer-Thomas, p. 350.
35. Arthur, Houck, and Beckford, pp. 139-159.
36. Ellis, p. 71.
37. The most popular of these was flood fallow, which consistOOof submerging the infected lands
in water for three to six months, during which time other lands would be utilized. See Bulmer-
Thomas, p. 107. May and Plaza (p. 93) explain how Panama Disease contributed to large-scale,
centralized operations because of the large expenditures and "advancOOengineering practices requieed to
combat it." Research on new methods of crop protection is carriOOout at hígh costs to UFCO-over
$1 million in 1958.
38. Furtado, p. 155. Central America failOOto achieve self-propellOOgrowth and development due
to its historicallack of internal capital; however, import substitution policies did reduce reliance on
other countries for neOOedprüducts by focusing the region's economic dependence on TNCs.
39. Ellis, p. 109.
40. Bulmer-Thomas, p. 109.
41. Ellis, p. 130; Bulmer-Thomas, p. 152. The 1958 ruling held that UFCO must "establish an
independent rival by 1966."
42. An interesting case is examinOOby EIlis (p.l18), in which Costa Rica introduced a law
dropping virtually all barriers to entry for banana prüducers. Standard Fruit's response was immediate,
and two other companies soon followed: The West Indies Fruit Company and Afrikanische Frucht
Compagnie Laeisz (p. 123). This is also notOOby Bulmer- Thomas, p. 152.
43. Bulmer-Thomas, pp. 109, 141. The origin of the Guatemalan case was Arbenz's attempts at
agrarian reform, which included the confiscation (with compensation) of many large, uncultivatOOland
holdings. Since UFCO had undervalued its lands for tax purposes, its compensation was considered
inadequate, and thus began a successfullobbying campaign to encourage U.S. intervention in the
country. In Honduras, UFCO was forced to recognize the Tela Railroad Company's trade union,
thereby opening the door to protective legislation.
44. The Quepos division in Costa Rica was shut down in 1957 and Tiquisate in Guatemala
followOOin 1964 (EIlis, pp. 116, 128).
45. For a complete analysis of CACM, consult Bulmer-Thomas, pp. 177-199. Panama was not
included in the Common Market.
46. Such contractual obligations had, by this time, become less costly to UFCO than maintaining
its own production facilities in some areas. Most of the risks were transferred to the "independent"
producers, while the eamings were accrued by UFCO.
47. Del Monte's entry into banana production was spurred by the same laws that helped Standard
Fruit expand in Costa Rica. The two companies noted earher, West Indies Fruit Company and
21
Afrikanische Frucht Compagnie Laeisz, would be subsequently absorbed by Del Monte and UFCO in
1967 and 1976, respectively (Ellis, p. 123).
48. Ellis, p. 405.
49. In fact, one could substantiate UFCO's position as having improved due to its ability to battle
Panama Disease through greater research expenditures and advanced engineering activities that could
not be undertaken by the individual countries because of their capital-intensive nature.
50. One could say that Costa Rica was playing on oligopolistic competition lObetter its position.
This idea is further developed by Hymer.
51. UFCO's position may even have improved due to the new earnings taxes imposed in the
1950s, which made the countries still more reliant on company exports as a source of national
revenue.
52. Poynter, p. 51.
53. Ellis, p. 408.
54. UFCO's position in the Honduran economy continued lObe of great importance after this
event, but the company would pursue more capital-intensive production techniques in the future in
order lOdecrease its dependence on local labor. This is in line with Poynter's observations (p. 51).
55. Poynter, p. 51.
56. Ibid., pp. 57-66.
57. For a complete study of Guatemalan-UFCO relations in 1954, consult Schlesinger and Kinzer
(1982).
58. Costa Rica's dismantlement of its armed forces in 1948 opened the door to a well-rooted
democratic system in which negotiation rather than force was the norm.
59. Furtado, p.155
60. In addition to its activities in the fruit industry, UB was also involved in meat packing and food
processing. For more information, consult Castillo Rivas, p.44; Casson, p.326; and Barry and
Preusch, p. 149.
61. Barry and Preusch, p. 345.
62. Ellis, pp. 105, 130--131; Casson, pp. 325-326.
63. Ellis, pp. 125-126, 134.
64. This agreement, approved by the politicalleaders of Costa Rica, Honduras, Panama,
Guatemala, Nicaragua, Colombia, and Ecuador, provided for an increased export tax and an
organization to express the combined interests and demands of the banana-exporting countries. See
López Pérez, p. 39.
65. Bulmer-Thomas, p. 203; Vallejo Mejía, p. 124. This was equivalent to 50 percent of the
shipping price or $.025 per pound.
66. Ellis, p. 336; López Pérez, p. 42; Vallejo Mejía, p. 125.
67. Litvak and Maule, pp. 47-56.
68. During this time there was much discussion regarding nationalization of some operations of the
fruit companies, and Costa Rica went so far as to draw up legislation on expropriation procedures, but
each of the countries recognized its limitations in commercial control of such large enterprises (Ellis,
p. 337).
69. Vallejo Mejía, p. 95; Ellis, pp. 337-388. Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and Venezuela
have since joined.
70. Ecuador refused to become a member, and the Central American members were unable to
provide an alternative to TNC control of the banana industry within their borders.
71. Ellis, p. 350. UB subsequently refused to replant 1,900 hectares that had been destroyed by the
hurricane.
72. This incident held grave consequences for UB' s public image, as was obviously perceived by
the company president, who committed suicide (López Pérez, p. 45).
73. Ellis, pp. 351-352.
74. Ibid., p. 348.
75. One million dollars in annual rent was to be paid to Panama, and another million dollars was
required to cover port costs, railroad usage, and municipal taxes (López Pérez, p. 44; Ellis, p. 349).
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76. This organization was LOcoordinate banana sales only to nontraditional markets, in order to
avoid competition with the TNCs. Among the targets 01'COMUNBANA were Eastern Europe, Nonh
Africa, and the Middic East (Ellis, p. 355).
77. López Pérez, pp. 81-83.
78. Ibid., pp. 48--49. The UPEB calculated savings 1.0the fruit companies at S50 million in 1985.
79. Ibid., p. 97.
80. The most significant of these reactians was UB's withdrawal fre)Jn banana producLion in
GolfiLO, Costa Rica, in 1985. Several reasans for UB's exil are given by López Pérez (pp. 129-140),
including an extensive strike, which eventually resulled in irreconcilable e!ifferences between UB ane!
CosLa Rica.
81. Valleja Mejía, pp. 158, 164-166; López Pérez, pp. 177,185-200. U.S. oppasiLion Lo Lhe
Convenio Internacional sobre el Banano has effecLively climinished UPEB's aULhoriLyin
accomplishing its objecLives.
82. See Barry ami Preusch, p. 345, for a complete list 01'UB's subsicliaries in CenLral America.
83. Feldman, pp. 120-121, ane! Barry and Preusch, p. 152.
84. It has been suggested that Linder's motive was the saJc af two UB subsic1iaries, lohn Morrell &
Co. meaL packers and Tropical Radio Telegraph, anc1 Lheclosure of Golfito in Costa Rica (Casson, p.
340; López Pérez, p. 134).
85. Casson, pp. 330-331; Barry and Preusch, p. 346.
86. Casson, p. 331.
87. Felc1man, p. 122.
88. Lópcz Pérez, pp. 118-119. UB's utilization 01'associaLe praducers has be en slight compared to
Standard Fruit and particularl; Del Monte. The principal arcas af growth in such activiLies are located
in Costa Rica and due to pressure from that governmcnt.
89. Feldman (pp. 122-123) offers some more recenL sunistics: of the total S285,258,000 in banana
exports fram Honduras in 1986, appraximately 60 percenl carne fram UB. Anc1 in export tax revenues,
Costa Rica has benefiLed mast with a total of $338.6 million callected fram 1974-1984.
90. López Pérez, p. 34. Also 0[' inLerest is the decline in U1Xrevenues as a resulL of negotiations in
the 1980s. This can be observed from Lhe table in Felc1man, p.I23.
91. Schlesinger offers a very deulÍlec1 account 01'Lhe involvemenL of members 01'the StaLe
Department in the o\crthraw af Arbenz in 1954, and 01' their conneclions lo Unilec1 Fruit Company in
Bitler FruÍl.
92. Barry and Preusch, p. 152. RedueLions in Ihe labor force have be en a phenomenon 01' the 1970s
and 1980s as impravccl techniques and greater worker organization have bccn implcmcntcd (López
Pérez, p. 31).
93. PoyntcT, p. 103.
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